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Why might we want to forecast civil litigation? We usually are con-
cerned with anticipating the future because we want to do something
about it. We need to know tomorrow's weather in order to decide
what to wear or do. Farmers and sailors need longer range forecasts.
We need to understand climate change over decades or centuries in
order to moderate its effects by reducing carbon dioxide emissions.
We study pollution levels in order to limit them and we monitor
reserves of natural resources so as not to exhaust them before we find
substitutes. We track demographic changes that will affect the ability
of the military to recruit or of the working population to support the
retired. We need to predict recession and inflation in order to adjust
interest rates. We try to coordinate levels of taxation and government
spending. Businesses need to predict costs, demand, and competition.
Investors bet on price trends. And government is concerned about
the need for services: highways and mass transit can become con-
gested, police and garbage collection overstretched, and schools and
hospitals overcrowded.
But why should we care about litigation? If there is too much
(there rarely seems to be too little, although specialized courts have
atrophied from too few litigants), waiting time increases. That home-
ostatic mechanism makes litigation less attractive, reducing filings. If
plaintiffs dislike the delay, defendants welcome it-indeed, they con-
tribute mightily. And though justice delayed may be justice denied,
we do not seem to care about quality very much. Look at the delays
we already tolerate: plaintiffs have not seen a penny of the billions of
dollars in damages awarded nearly twenty years after the Exxon
Valdez disaster.1 By contrast, half the cases were resolved in less than
ten months in New Haven County in the 1920s;2 most were concluded
* ConneU Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA School of Law.
1. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Take Up Battle Over Exxon Valdez, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2008,
at A19; Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
2. CHARLES E. CLARK & HARRY SHULMAN, A STUDY OF LAW ADMINISTRATION IN CON-
NEcrICUT 31 tbl.14 (1937).
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in weeks in Kenya in the 1960s. 3 Or consider our state court judiciary,
which is chosen by political patronage and increasingly through elec-
tions bought by special interests, paid little and respected less, and
offered few prospects for advancement. 4
Nevertheless, I will assume there is an interest in predicting litiga-
tion in 2020. What do we want to know? Gross numbers? Case type?
Litigant characteristics? Process? Cost to litigants? Delay? Out-
comes? Demands on the system? An uncontested divorce, default
eviction, or debt collection consume insignificant resources compared
with an IBM antitrust suit. And can we know any of this? Most fore-
casting simply extrapolates present trends; the real challenge is to pre-
dict the unpredictable. In this Article I build on our limited empirical
and theoretical understanding of the past to offer some hunches about
the future.
II. LONGITUDINAL STUDIES
Longitudinal studies of litigation are expensive to conduct and diffi-
cult to interpret. Lengthy time-series data are scarce. Record keeping
is imperfect, statistical categories constantly change, and there are
many extraneous causes of variation. Nevertheless, we can draw a few
lessons from these efforts. First, as a category of social action, civil
litigation is even less meaningful than the crime rate, which includes
such disparate behaviors as murder and jaywalking. One indication of
the incoherence of litigation is the wide variation of rates within a
single polity (American states or equivalent courts within other coun-
tries).5 We need to distinguish among disputes over debt, divorce,
personal injury, property, and contract (to mention only the categories
that account for most of the civil caseload). 6 As Durkheim showed,
even a behavioral category that superficially seems unitary, such as
suicide, may contain different motivations. 7 A rise in litigation rates
may be just a temporary blip, like name changes by second generation
3. Richard L. Abel, Western Courts in Non-Western Settings: Patterns of Court Use in Colonial
and Neo-Colonial Africa, in THE IMPOSITION OF LAW 167, 187 (Sandra Burman & Barbara E.
Harrell-Bond eds., 1979).
4. Anemona Hartocollis, New York's Top Judge Sues over Judicial Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
2008, at B3 (trial judges paid $136,700 per year; no raise since January 1999).
5. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1206 tbl.4 (1992) (American states); June
Starr & Jonathan Pool, The Impact of a Legal Revolution in Rural Turkey, 8 LAW & Soc'v REV.
533, 544 (1974) (Turkey); Erhard Blankenburg, Studying the Frequency of Civil Litigation in
Germany, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 307, 310 (1975) (West and East Germany).
6. Craig Wanner, The Public Ordering of Private Relations: Part One: Initiating Civil Cases in
Urban Trial Courts, 8 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 421, 422 (1974).
7. See generally EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY (1951).
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immigrants in New York City in the 1930s. Once we have identified
more coherent subcategories, we have to separate the underlying be-
havior from the decision to make that behavior the subject of litiga-
tion. Fluctuations in litigation rates are a composite of changes
outside and inside the legal arena. Police and prosecutors pursue a
much higher proportion of murders than crimes such as speeding or
tax evasion; private individuals concerned with directing the disposi-
tion of their property after death are much more likely to consult law-
yers than those who feel they have suffered employment
discrimination. 8 And many different causes of action may be com-
bined in a single case or fragmented in multiple filings.
Longitudinal studies across a wide variety of periods and places
tend to support a few broad generalizations.
A. As States Increase Criminal Prosecutions, There is a
Concomitant Decline in Civil Litigation9
Given a sufficiently long historical perspective, this is hardly sur-
prising. The state is a relative newcomer, even more recent in many
non-western societies. As it gains power, citizens relinquish responsi-
bility for law enforcement to government officials who disapprove of
vigilantism. Increasing individualism deprives a grievant of the group
support necessary to seek redress without state power. When courts
come to be seen as instruments of state regulation, they are less attrac-
tive as force for civil justice.
B. Civil Litigation Rates Are Curvilinear10
Litigation rates rise with economic growth and consequent social
change, and then they decline as those processes persist. Like so
many explanations for litigation, the relationship is overdetermined.
Industrialization unsettles everything: property rights, relations of
production, labor markets, causes of injuries, availability of consumer
goods. Social relations are transformed by labor migration, the redefi-
nition of gender roles, and paid employment outside the household,
among other causes. Litigation is related to increases in social com-
plexity, differentiation, and scale. 1 Litigation shifts from local to
8. BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A
NATIONAL SURVEY 139 fig.4.28, 196 fig.5.14 (1977).
9. Abel, supra note 3, at 181-82 (documenting litigation in Kenya).
10. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973).
11. See generally Austin Sarat & Joel B. Grossman, Courts and Conflict Resolution: Problems
in the Mobilization of Adjudication, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1200 (1975).
2009]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
more-distant adversaries.12 Litigation increases in rural areas but de-
creases in urban.13 As new legal understandings are solidified, behav-
ior conforms, and parties settle disputes because their litigated
outcomes have become more predictable. 14
C. During this Period of Industrial Revolution, Urbanization, and
Corporate Concentration, Property and Contract Litigation Decline
While Tort and Divorce Litigation Increase15
Property litigation declines outside major cities when capital dis-
places land as the principal factor of production. 16 Contracts are in-
creasingly dictated by more powerful parties. Tort litigation rises as
technology increases the capacity to inflict serious harm inadvertently.
Marriages become more fragile as men serve in wars and women enter
the workforce.1 7
III. CHANGES IN THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
Changes in the social environment can affect both the incidence of
conflict and the likelihood that it will lead to litigation. I have distin-
guished changes in demography, social and economic relations, the
state, and technology, although the categories often overlap.
A. Demography
The growth and contraction of the population obviously can influ-
ence litigation, as can changes in its composition. Litigation is related
to age and therefore to the age structure of the population.18 Because
women are postponing child bearing and are having fewer children,
12. See generally FRANCIS LAURENT, THE BUSINESS OF A TRIAL COURT: 100 YEARS OF
CASES (1959); cf. Richard L. Abel, Case Method Research in the Customary Law of Wrongs in
Kenya, Part II: Statistical Analysis, 6 E. AFR. L.J. 20, 26 tbl.2 (1970) (parties in rural Kenya living
close in proximity to each other).
13. Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Ala-
meda and San Benito Counties, 10 LAW & Soc'y REV. 267, 297-99 (1976); Abel, supra note 3, at
183 tbl.10.6.
14. Friedman & Percival, supra note 13, at 296. See generally Stephen Daniels, Trial Courts of
Spoon River: Patterns and Changes, 1870-1963 (June 11-14, 1981) (paper prepared for the 1981
Meeting of the Law and Society Association in Amherst, Massachusetts) (on file with author).
15. See generally LAURENT, supra note 12 (Wisconsin); THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF COURTS (Jethro K. Lieberman
ed., 1984); Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May Not Want to
Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 577.
16. See generally Stephen Daniels, Caseload Dynamics and the Nature of Change: The Civil
Business of Trial Courts in Four Illinois Counties, 24 LAW & Soc'y REV. 299 (1990).
17. See generally MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW (1972).
18. CURRAN, supra note 8, at 188 fig.5.2.
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and life expectancy is increasing, the population is aging.19 Since we
know that litigation is related to race, 20 it is likely to be related to
ethnicity and immigration. Although immigrant families tend to have
more children, many immigrants (especially the undocumented) are
single men.21 The aging (but shrinking) native-born population may
litigate more, the younger (and growing) immigrant population less.
Of course, all these differences in litigation rates could change.
Despite growing prosperity, increased life expectancy and rising
costs for medical care at the end of life tend to deplete estates espe-
cially if the elderly spend down to qualify for Medicaid. Both nuclear
and extended families are smaller. Beneficiaries who also are older
when they inherit may have less need for the property. All this may
mean fewer inheritance disputes; however, the growing number of
wealthy may have intensely bitter inheritance disputes. Because much
elder care is provided through the informal sector by undocumented
workers, labor conflicts in that sector are unlikely to be addressed
through litigation.22 Although health care for the elderly may be
lower in quality, damages for malpractice will be much lower, making
such lawsuits less attractive.
Patterns of marriage and procreation have been changing rapidly.
Youth are sexually mature and active earlier; access to contraception
and abortion affects the number of children born out of wedlock. Un-
married mothers are more likely to be on welfare.23 As the age of
marriage rises, marriages may become more stable. At the same time,
combat duty, which has increased during the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq, historically has threatened marriage. High rates of divorce and
remarriage create melded families, with complex intra- and inter-
generational rights and obligations to children, income, and prop-
erty.24 Later marriage means lower fertility. Same-sex relationships
are increasingly recognized. Both older infertile and same-sex couples
who want children have turned to surrogate mothers, artificial insemi-
nation, and adoption, all of which can create new legal issues regard-
ing rights to and responsibilities for children.
19. See generally Bali Ram, Fertility Decline and Social Change: New Trends and Challenges,
30 CAN. STUD. IN POPULATION 297 (2003).
20. CURRAN, supra note 8, at 188 fig.5.3.
21. See Alfred Tella, The Costs of Immigration, WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 18, 2005. at A15.
22. See Barry Newman, Who Will Care for U.S. Elderly if Border Closes?, WALL ST. J., July
26, 2006, at B1.
23. Abigail Trafford, A Poor Excuse for Marriage, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2002, at FO.
24. See Margorie Engel, Do I Have an Obligation to Support My Stepchildren., NAT'L





Donald Black hypothesized that the likelihood of resort to law var-
ies directly with the social distance between the parties.25 Studying
Kenya in the 1960s, I found that litigation varied directly with tribal
heterogeneity, urbanization, and population density.2 6  Max
Gluckman argued that parties were less likely to litigate if bound by
multiplex rather than simplex ties because of the greater cost of rup-
ture.27 Therefore, the transition from traditional to modern society
usually exhibits an increase in litigation. But this process may be self-
limiting and it may even reverse direction (providing one possible ex-
planation for the curvilinear pattern of longitudinal litigation rates).
Just as people fight those they love,28 they sue those they know.
Strangers have fewer occasions and reasons for litigation.29 Tradi-
tional face-to-face societies without significant material inequalities
are structured in terms of status and respect. Litigation serves to de-
fend honor.30 Accidental misfortune is blamed on human emotions
manifested through beliefs in witchcraft and sorcery. 31 Modern mass
societies composed of strangers differentiated by wealth commodify
all experience, assigning money values to physical injury, psychic dis-
tress, and impaired relationships. Because intentional wrongdoers
rarely can pay for the harm they inflict, contemporary tort law
stretches notions of proximate cause to hold responsible deep-pocket
defendants whose negligence may have permitted or facilitated the
injury (e.g., premises liability for crimes against tenants or shoppers).
The result is less conflict over intentional torts and more conflict over
negligence.
Honor persists in enclaves of modern societies, as shown by our un-
diminished passion for gossip, especially among adolescents (now
25. DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 41-42 (1976). See generally CAROL J. GREEN-
HOUSE, BARBARA YNGVESSON & DAVID M. ENGEL, LAW AND COMMUNITY IN THREE AMERI-
CAN TowNs (1994).
26. Abel, supra note 3, at 183 tbl.10.6.
27. MAx GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODE-
SIA 20-23 (1955). See generally MAx GLUCKMAN, CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA (1955).
28. OSCAR WILDE, Ballad of Reading Gaol, in PLAYS, PROSE WRITINGS AND POEMS 404
(Guernsey Press Co. Ltd. 1988) (1930) ("Yet each man kills the thing he loves"). See generally
E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, THE NUER (1940).
29. M.P. BAUMGARTNER, THE MORAL ORDER OF A SUBURB 11 (1988).
30. See generally Richard L. Abel, The Rise of Capitalism and the Transformation of Disput-
ing: From Confrontations over Honor to Competition for Property, 27 UCLA L. REV. 223 (1979)
(review essay of JUNE STARR, DISPUTE AND SETTLEMENT IN RURAL TURKEY: AN ETHNOGRA-
PHY OF LAW (1978)).
31. See generally WITCHCRAFT AND SORCERY IN EAST AFRICA (John Middleton & E.H. Win-




through cell phones, texting, and the Internet) and co-workers, as well
as the widespread obsession with celebrities. Gangs fight over turf in
defense of honor. And status competition thrives among collectivities
defined by gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, nationality,
ethnicity, and physical difference. 32
Albert Hirschman distinguished three responses to conflict: exit,
voice, and loyalty. 33 By lowering the cost of exit from families, neigh-
borhoods, associations, and work (the settings where conflict is most
likely to occur), modern societies diminish the relative attractiveness
of the other two alternatives: loyalty (lumping it)34 and voice (litiga-
tion). 35 Contrary to Maine's generalization, the history of human so-
cieties has not always been the movement from status to contract.36
Stuart Macaulay found that businesses with ongoing contractual rela-
tionships (such as automobile manufacturers and dealers) were very
reluctant to litigate. 37 Litigation in traditional societies pits equal
against equal, which may be one source of its attraction. Uncertain
outcomes encourage litigation, whereas certainty facilitates settle-
ment. Furthermore, the process can be the outcome (e.g., by defend-
ing one's honor in traditional societies or by impoverishing one's
adversary in contemporary litigation by attrition).38 Even though the
pediment of the U.S. Supreme Court promises "Equal Justice Under
Law," most contemporary litigation is by unequals. Marc Galanter,
building on Craig Wanner, has shown that one-shot versus one-shot
cases generally concern divorce, and repeat player versus repeat
player cases are rare.39 Furthermore, repeat players sue one-shot de-
fendants (generally in contract, especially to enforce debts) much
more often than the reverse (tort claims). 40
American law has withdrawn protection from some relationships,
abolishing actions for breach of promise of marriage and alienation of
32. See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, SPEAKING RESPECT, RESPECTING SPEECH (1998).
33. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DE-
CLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
34. William L.F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 63, 81-82 (1974) (refering to the process of avoiding a dispute as "lumping it").
35. BAUMGARTNER, supra note 29, at 11-12, 127-28.
36. See generally HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1873).
37. See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); STEWART MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER:
THE AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS (1966).
38. See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979).
39. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974); Craig Wanner, The Public Ordering of
Private Relations: Part Two: Winning Civil Court Cases, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 293 (1975).
40. Wanner, supra note 39, at 294.
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affections. The law also has extended protection to new relationships:
heterosexual cohabitants, same-sex partners, grandparents and
grandchildren, fathers of children born out of wedlock, and adopted
children (with regard to access to information about birth parents).
Societies differ in who may assert legal rights. American law has
eliminated many exclusions based on race, gender, age, and mental
illness. Citizenship and legal residence remain the single largest ob-
stacles to legal personhood; their elimination could significantly in-
crease litigation over employment, housing, education, health care,
injuries, divorce, and inheritance.
C. Economic Relations
Natural persons are not the only legal actors whose demographic
fluctuation can affect litigation. The nineteenth century creation of
artificial persons-corporations-transformed the landscape of dis-
puting.41 There is reason to believe that small dispersed economic ac-
tors litigate more than large ones which have the power to achieve
their objectives outside of litigation. If business corporations are pro-
liferating and expanding, other collectivities may be declining, such as
voluntary associations, churches, and trade unions. 42 That reduces the
number of collective actors that might litigate while increasing the
propensity of individual members to do so since they can no longer
pursue their goals collectively.
State action can significantly influence the propensity to litigate.
On one hand, state intervention into the market-i.e., regulation-has
provoked a great deal of litigation: controls of prices (both anti-infla-
tionary caps and agricultural price supports), wages, and rents; ration-
ing of supply; controls of land use, labor, and immigration;
conscription into the military; prohibition or regulation of alcohol,
drugs, gambling, and prostitution; antitrust efforts to limit concentra-
tion; and the protection of property rights (especially intellectual
property). On the other hand, state displacement of market actors
can dramatically reduce occasions for litigation in many areas, includ-
ing public pensions, housing, education, transportation, and policing.
A single-payer health care plan would eliminate the debt collection
efforts of health care providers (hospitals, clinics, and doctors), as well
41. See generally JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES
(1977).




as many malpractice claims (since the state would care for those
injured).43
D. Polity
Government may participate in litigation as both plaintiff and de-
fendant.4 4 It may use courts to increase tax revenues or structure
taxes so that evasion is more difficult and enforcement less necessary.
For instance, it may substitute a value-added tax for an income tax,
which depends on individuals truthfully reporting revenue and deduc-
tions. The weight of the tax burden will affect levels of voluntary
compliance and hence the need for judicial enforcement. Govern-
ment may enforce regulations in court (e.g., worker or consumer
safety, wages and hours, price controls, environmental protection) or
seek to negotiate compliance.4 5 Public housing can lead to litigation
over unpaid rent, damage to property, or eviction. 46 Social welfare
benefits are more likely to generate litigation if the pie is contracting
rather than expanding and benefits are rule-based rather than discre-
tionary.47 Litigation can also be a means of private governance, as in
efforts to gain control over corporations, unions, and churches.4
E. Technology
The technological revolution that began in the nineteenth century
enormously increased mankind's capacity to do harm, both acciden-
tally and intentionally. Warfare, including weapons of mass destruc-
tion, genocide, massive disasters like Bhopal, Chernobyl, and Exxon
43. Hospitals filed eleven percent of the claims brought by organizations in trial courts in the
early 1970s; that proportion has almost certainly increased. Wanner, supra note 6, at 425 tbl.3.
44. See generally Wolf Heydebrand, Government Litigation and National Policymaking: From
Roosevelt to Reagan, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 477 (1990); WOLF HEYDEBRAND AND CARROLL
SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
(1990).
45. See generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW (2001); ROBERT A. KAGAN & EUGENE BARDACH, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM
OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982); KEITH HAWKINS, LAW AS LAST RESORT:
PROSECUTORIAL DECISION-MAKING IN A REGULATORY AGENCY (2002); ENFORCING REGULA-
TION (Keith Hawkins & John Thomas eds., 1984). The federal government has greatly increased
the use of "deferred prosecution" of corporate defendants. Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D.
McConnell, Annual Corporate Pre-Trial Agreement Update-2007 (2008), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1080263.
46. See generally Richard Lempert, Docket Data and "Local Knowledge": Studying the Court
and Society Link over Time, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 321 (1990).
47. See generally Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
48. Consider recent struggles within the Episcopal Church over ordination of gays and lesbi-




Valdez, and environmental degradation are only the most dramatic
examples. With the rise of mass transit-trains, ships, buses, and
planes-individual collisions and crashes can kill or maim hundreds,
even thousands. The displacement of railroads by cars multiplied the
number of accidents. Huge variation in the size of automobiles, from
two-seater fuel savers to Hummers, greatly increases the likelihood of
injuries or fatalities in smaller cars. Mass production and consump-
tion allows negligently designed products to harm huge numbers of
victims. The telegraph enormously improved communication but also
allowed miscommunication, transmitting death notices to the wrong
recipient.
When I studied torts in Kenya in the 1960s, the only examples of
negligence were cattle trespass and accidental fires. 49 Pangas
(machetes) were much less likely to kill than guns. By 1900, industrial
accidents in the United States were killing 35,000 a year and injuring
two million, disabling 500,000 of them for a week or more.50 During
the same period, level-grade crossing accidents were killing 10,000 a
year-a higher proportion of the population than die annually in car
accidents today. Although the elimination of such crossings-and
then of railroads-largely ended this problem, the proliferation of au-
tomobiles in countries with inadequate roads and regulation of drivers
and automobiles has wreaked havoc.51
Technology also can greatly enhance safety. Airplane crashes have
become much less frequent. Automobile designs, including
mandatory seat belts and air bags, have reduced traffic fatalities; hel-
mets have reduced bicycle and motorcycle head injuries. Smart cars
and automated highways might prevent many collisions. If conges-
tion, fuel costs, and concern about global warming lead to more public
transportation, the number of road accidents will further decrease. A
variety of simple technological fixes could significantly reduce medical
malpractice. 52 Advances in medicine have greatly increased our abil-
ity to save the lives of trauma victims, transforming death cases into
claims for injury, where damages perversely are higher. Greater life
expectancy, a product of diet, lifestyle, health care, safer work, and
fewer accidental injuries, also increases the damages of those who are
injured. Both of these trends encourage more litigation.
49. See generally Abel, supra note 12, at 26 tbl.2.
50. FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 422.
51. Posting of Daniel McDermon to The New York Times Wheels Blog, http://wheels.blogs.
nytimes.com/2007/12/07/in-india-more-cars-going-faster (Dec. 7, 2007, 13:18 EST).
52. See generally ATUL GAWANDE, BETrER: A SURGEON'S NoTEs ON PERFORMANCE (2007).
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IV. CHANGES IN THE LEGAL ENVIRONMtNT
A. Substantive Law
Academics have occasionally convinced courts to recognize new le-
gal rights. For example, courts created the right to privacy following
Warren and Brandeis53 and provided protection from sexual harass-
ment in response to Catherine MacKinnon. 54 Rights have been won
through the struggles of social movements on behalf of racial and re-
ligious minorities, women, sexual minorities, the disabled, children,
prisoners, consumers, and environmentalists. The extension of rights
to immigrants would greatly increase the potential for litigation. The
tentative and partial shifts from negligence to strict liability and from
contributory negligence and assumption of risk to comparative fault
permitted claims by negligent plaintiffs and against non-negligent de-
fendants. Insofar as those shifts also increased safety, however, they
reduced injuries and claims. Courts have extended protection to emo-
tional distress, loss of consortium, wrongful birth, and pure economic
loss. Contracts can ground tort claims against insurers for bad faith
denial of coverage. Courts have eliminated the legal immunities of
husbands, parents, charities, and governments. Each time courts have
recognized a new mass tort claim, victims filed a huge number of law-
suits, especially as courts have grown more hostile to class actions.
Examples include asbestos, the Dalkon shield, Agent Orange, to-
bacco, lead, mold, drugs and medical devices, guns, and clergy sexual
abuse. Lawyers have also invoked treaty rights by litigating under the
Alien Tort Statute55 (recently against American corporations for com-
plicity with apartheid). Litigation might increase significantly if inju-
ries that are not presently legally cognizable became actionable, such
as global warming and warfare.
Changes in substantive law can also contract or eliminate rights.
Actions for breach of promise of marriage and alienation of affections
have been abolished. Courts and legislatures have created qualified
immunities for those charged with defamation or invading the privacy
of public figures. 56 Backlash has curtailed some new rights (e.g., to
sue for discrimination or to sue under a theory of strict liability) and
restricted older rights (of workers and trade unions). Defendants
have invested heavily in electing state supreme court judges who will
53. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REv. 193 (1890).
54. See generally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:
A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
56. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281-82 (1964).
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limit liability. Product manufacturers and service providers have lob-
bied legislatures, often successfully, to reverse judicial impositions of
liability on tobacco, guns, airplanes, bartenders, cap damages, and
limit joint and several liability.57 Defendants held liable in state
courts have persuaded federal regulators to protect them by preempt-
ing state remedies. Regulation intended to safeguard consumers-
such as the U.S. Surgeon General's warnings on cigarette packages-
has been perverted to defeat the claims of injured smokers. The im-
perial Bush presidency has invoked doctrines of executive privilege,
state secrets, and sovereign immunity to defeat efforts to expose and
punish its illegal acts.58 It has insisted on immunizing the telecommu-
nications industry against suits for warrantless wiretapping of citi-
zens.59 Conspiracies of silence-by doctors, police, the military, and
the executive-can defeat lawsuits.
B. Remedies
Rights are worth little without remedies. For over a century, reme-
dies have generally expanded. Contemporary tort litigation, which
seeks money rather than honor, is driven by the search for a deep
pocket. Juries are more likely to find liability and award higher dam-
ages against wealthy defendants.60 The same market concentration
that allows an enterprise to do more harm also makes it better able to
compensate the victims. Contemporary tort law is the creature of lia-
bility insurance, which emerged in the nineteenth century. Insurers
and insureds have different incentives to defend. Vicarious liability
makes solvent employers strictly liable for the negligence of impecuni-
ous employees and insured car owners strictly liable for those who
drive negligently with their permission. Many states require regis-
tered car owners and licensed drivers to carry liability insurance.
However, there are many unregistered owners and unlicensed drivers,
liability limits are low, and insurance may be cancelled.
Requiring doctors and lawyers to carry malpractice insurance would
permit additional claims by patients and clients. Liens ensure that
those who provide goods or services on credit can collect if they sue.
The proximate cause doctrine allows victims to sue solvent negligent
57. Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49
DEPAUL L. REV. 533, 533-58 (1999).
58. White House of Mirrors, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2007, at 13.
59. Scott Shane, Agency and Bush Are Sued Over Domestic Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 2008, at A13.




defendants for facilitating torts committed by more culpable but insol-
vent or unknown tortfeasors (e.g., bartenders for serving alcohol to
those who cause injuries while driving drunk or landlords for inade-
quate safety precautions that result in assaults and robberies). 61 Joint
and several liability makes a minimally culpable solvent tortfeasor lia-
ble for damage inflicted by other, more culpable but insolvent
tortfeasors. Market share theory allows victims to sue manufacturers
of identical products even though plaintiffs cannot identify the causal
agent.62 Legislatures have tolled statutes of limitations until victims
could reasonably have known of their injuries.63
Just as rights have been pushed back, however, remedies have been
curtailed. Potential defendants can choose not to insure and hide
their assets.64 Rental car agencies, for exemple, have sought exemp-
tion from vicarious liability for their drivers. Employers (such as hos-
pitals) seek to turn employees (such as doctors) into independent
contractors.65 Legislatures have restricted joint and several liability,
excluding non-pecuniary damages for defendants less than fifty per-
cent at fault, and they have capped damages (pecuniary and non-pecu-
niary, compensatory and punitive) for some or all cases.66 The U.S.
Supreme Court has found that the Constitution limits punitive dam-
ages to less than ten times compensatory damages.67 Legislatures
have shortened statutes of limitations. Market share theory can be
narrowly construed by focusing on local markets, letting manufactur-
ers exculpate themselves, or making liability several rather than joint
and several. Some wrongs must go unredressed because our remedies
are inadequate. For example, we cannot compensate the deceased (or
comatose) for the loss of their lives or consciousness. 68 The existence
and adequacy of other remedies, such as private loss or social insur-
ance, may reduce the incentive to litigate, and those insurers may or
may not seek subrogation and litigate. Judicial hostility to class ac-
tions may perversely increase the number of individual lawsuits.
61. Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 441, 444 (1999).
62. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980).
63. See Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 185-87 (1997).
64. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1996).
65. Roessler v. Novak, 858 So. 2d 1158, 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (2000).
67. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).




The decision to sue is private, except when government is the plain-
tiff.69 A variety of factors may encourage plaintiffs to bring a lawsuit.
Just as capitalism extends the commodity form from goods to labor,
tort law commodifies all experience. Tort law requires juries to assign
monetary values to pain, loss of enjoyment, emotional distress, rela-
tionships (both those that are damaged or destroyed and those that
are involuntarily created, as in wrongful birth), death, life, and per-
haps even spiritual harms (caused by errors in performing rituals re-
lating to circumcision, marriage, or death). The prospect of monetary
recovery may encourage victims to view themselves as commodities
and seek damages ex-post even though they would not insure them-
selves ex-ante. However, some victims may be more interested in elic-
iting an apology, inflicting retribution, or changing risky behavior.
Unfortunately, lawyers discourage apology as an admission of liabil-
ity. In another setting-divorce-there is evidence that lawyers act as
a reality check, discouraging clients from fruitlessly seeking emotional
vindication by persuading them to accept what the law offers, namely
money.70 Seeing others receive damage awards may encourage vic-
tims to name an experience as a wrong. For example, miners no
longer accept emphysema as a fate suffered by every other miner they
know; rather, they view it as a preventable workplace disease. Attri-
bution theory helps us understand when victims blame themselves (as-
sumption of risk) or others for a wrong.71 Examples include spousal
abuse, road accidents, and injuries in the home or workplace. The
culture of the American frontier idealized self-sufficiency and, there-
fore, personal responsibility for one's fate, a mindset that has survived
in rural communities.72
Victims who name an experience as a "wrong" and blame others
still must choose among exit, voice, and loyalty; if they decide to voice
their concerns, they must then choose between litigation and other
forms of complaint, all of which may be a distasteful acknowledge-
69. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
70. AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS:
POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 53-56 (1995).
71. See generally Sally Lloyd-Bostock, Fault and Liability for Accidents: The Accident Victim's
Perspective, in COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY 139 (Donald Harris et al.
eds., 1984).
72. David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an
American Community, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 551 (1984).
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ment of vulnerability and dependence. 73 Defendants may be able to
discourage lawsuits by apologizing promptly and perhaps offering
nominal compensation.74 There are many enclaves in American soci-
ety that prefer to resolve conflict internally: residential, racial, ethnic,
and religious communities; dyads of producers and consumers; and
occupations. 75 There are significant demographic differences in the
belief that resort to the law will produce justice.76 Cultures differ in
their tolerance and encouragement of overt conflict. 77 All of these
choices are open to external influence: naming, blaming, and claiming
are learned behaviors.78 Victims may be encouraged to pursue litiga-
tion by seeing others sue for sexual harassment, racial discrimination,
or bullying. Litigation can be emulative, as when mass tort victims
sue, or a woman who testified in a friend's divorce proceeding decides
to seek divorce herself.79 Potential plaintiffs can also be persuaded
not to litigate: the tort reform campaign by insurers and defendants
sought, with apparent success, to convince Americans that many tort
claims are frivolous and damages excessive. Employers, fellow work-
ers, members of immigrant or ethnic communities, and police can
guide victims to or away from law.
Just as the consciousness that rights have been violated can affect
litigation, so does its obverse: law-abidingness. Suppose we make as-
sumptions about law analogous to those that economists make about
perfect markets: laws are unambiguous and comprehensive (the
pandectist ideal); they are universally known; enforcement is auto-
matic; and penalties are sufficiently high to deter violations. Under
such circumstances, there would be no litigation. Potential deviants
would anticipate enforcement and choose to comply. In the rare in-
stances when transgressions occurred by mistake, violators would im-
mediately settle any claims to avoid the costs of litigation, whose
outcome would be certain. Relaxing each assumption allows us to see
its influence on litigation. Legal uncertainty, loopholes, and public ig-
73. See generally Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory
Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 701 (1977).
74. Adam Davidson, Working Stiffs, HARPER'S MAG., Aug. 2001, at 48, 53-54 (Schneider Na-
tional, largest trucking company, has wholly owned insurance subsidiary which practices "em-
pathetic adjusting").
75. See generally GREENHOUSE et al., supra note 25; MACAULAY, supra note 37.
76. CURRAN, supra note 8, at 251-52 fig.6.6, 252 fig.6.7.
77. See generally THE DISPUTING PROCESS: LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES (Laura Nader & Harry F.
Todd Jr. eds., 1978).
78. See generally William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 631 (1981).
79. See generally DIVORCE AND AFTER (Paul Bohannan ed., 1970).
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norance encourage deviance. So does the ability to conceal the viola-
tion, beat the rap, corrupt the courts, or escape with a slap on the
wrist. The massive resistance of southern states to Brown v. Board of
Education,80 the indifference of prison systems and police depart-
ments to lawsuits for abuse of prisoners and suspects, and the determi-
nation of tobacco companies to avoid liability are examples.
Tortfeasors pay a premium to settle the first claims for a potential
mass tort in order to buy plaintiffs' silence by sealing the record,
thereby denying similarly situated victims the information they would
need to "name, blame, and claim." Conspiracies of silence about
medical malpractice by doctors or abuse by police officers can make
litigation fruitless. Resistance by defendants initially increases litiga-
tion, by foreclosing settlement, but stonewalling by sufficiently power-
ful defendants can ultimately discourage litigation by convincing
potential plaintiffs that litigation is futile or not cost effective.
V. CHANGES IN THE STAKES
I suggested earlier that socio-cultural variables shape whether con-
flict concerns position in a status hierarchy (honor, respect) or control
over material goods. Both kinds of resources can yield power, public
and private. Societies differ in what can be owned, with what rights,
and by whom. Hunting and gathering economies have few property
rights except in relationships, profane knowledge about where to find
food, and sacred knowledge about how to live in the world. Pastoral-
ists own livestock, which can be pledged, loaned, given, sold, inher-
ited, stolen, and killed. Agriculturalists own land, in which similar
transactions are possible, except for destruction. Land endures for-
ever, creating a fertile source of disputes, since in the absence of writ-
ten records memories are unreliable and subject to manipulation.
Unlike livestock, land cannot be hidden, but it can be appropriated
through occupation or destruction of crops, structures, and boundary
markers. It is possible to subdivide interests in livestock (milk, meat,
and offspring-all of which can be concealed) and even easier to sub-
divide interests in land. Land, unlike livestock, is often held collec-
tively, perhaps increasing conflict among members but reducing it
with outsiders, who can claim no rights. Tension arises between pas-
toral and agricultural economies when livestock damages crops, creat-
ing disputes about the obligation to fence in or out. Industrialization
80. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349
U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955).
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transforms the value of land and invests value, and. thus property
rights, in natural resources and capital.
Pastoral, agricultural, and industrial economies each value labor dif-
ferently, creating different kinds of disputes between employers and
employees. Agricultural and industrial economies may conflict when
each pollutes the commons. Residential property may be rented or
owned, as individual houses, condominiums, or cooperatives, each of
which creates different kinds and amounts of disputes. Post-industrial
service economies increase the value of skilled labor and intangible
property. Because intellectual property cannot be physically pos-
sessed, conflict over its ownership is likely to increase. Some question
whether there should be any property rights in information (e.g., open
source computing, copying of music, text, and images).
Conflict over property is a function of scarcity or abundance. Re-
sources tend to be abundant (even free goods) when each new econ-
omy first emerges, and then they become scarce. The Internet initially
was free for all users, then it was free for just some but increasingly
financed through advertising, and now it is near the limit of its capac-
ity, forcing it to ration by price or some other mechanism. Greater
freedom to contract also increases the potential for conflict. At the
same time, carefully drafted wills and contracts (including liquidated
damage clauses, leases, prenuptial agreements and agreements not to
sue in tort) can anticipate and avoid conflict.
Because litigation is so expensive, property disputes are more likely
to be litigated if the amount in controversy is substantial. That condi-
tion is usually satisfied within commercial enterprises, which them-
selves aggregate the interests of many, and among the wealthy. We
can distinguish the occasions when most non-wealthy individuals accu-
mulate sufficient property to make litigation worthwhile. For the vast
majority who do not begin life with trust funds, birth does not gener-
ate legal disputes, though paternity may be contested. Disputes over
birth were common, however, when office was inherited. By contrast,
death requires transmission of accumulated wealth. Legal systems
that rigidly prescribe that distribution permit conflict only about the
identity of beneficiaries (usually defined by kinship), but the tendency
has been to increase testamentary freedom and with it the potential
for conflict.
All but the wealthiest, who negotiate prenuptial agreements, enter
marriage with little property, though this may be changing as people
marry later and remarry after divorce or death. Divorce, by contrast,
always requires a division of property and often rights in children.
The enormous inflation in housing prices in recent decades, before the
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collapse fueled, by sub-prime loans,81 led to higher stakes, greater in-
vestment in divorce lawyering, and inevitably increased litigation.8 2
Divorce itself has been increasing for a century. Because short-term
residential leases have relatively little value at the outset, few tenants
invest legal resources in drafting them, although landlords may pay for
boilerplate language they can use repeatedly.
The investment in a residence increases over time as residents place
their children in local schools, make friends with neighbors, learn
about local amenities, and find nearby employment, making it worth-
while to resist eviction. Rent stabilization and vacancy decontrol can
increase the stakes of such contests for both tenant and landlord. The
acquisition of a home or apartment is the largest purchase most peo-
ple ever make and is thus worthy of a significant investment of legal
resources. It almost always is financed by a mortgage, which aggre-
gates future savings over twenty-five to thirty years. Loss of a home
through foreclosure can be catastrophic, as the current sub-prime cri-
sis demonstrates. Our credit economy (a post-World War II phenom-
enon, which the English evocatively call buying on the "never never")
permits many purchases that otherwise would never have been made
and will be paid for over months or years.83 Educational loans are the
latest, and often the most onerous, form of consumer debt. Although
lawyers often facilitate business formation through partnership agree-
ments and incorporation, conflict is rare at the inception. But dissolu-
tions, reorganizations, and especially bankruptcies are usually
contested. Shareholder derivative actions aggregate the interests of
all shareholders who have been affected by the misconduct of corpo-
rate officers. In tort actions, general damages capitalize past and fu-
ture medical expenses as well as earning capacity, while general
damages do the same for experience general damages.
Law lets us not only assert rights over property but also control
risk.84 Changes in social structure, economy, political organization,
and technology have allowed humankind to reduce many risks while
increasing others, such as global warming, war, and environmental
degradation. Some economic changes increase exposure to risk,
which is often seen as opportunity. Executory contracts are an exam-
81. David Cho & Neil Irwin, Lawmakers Split on Merits of Mortgage Bailout, Prrr. POST-
GAZETTE, Dec. 7, 2007, at Al.
82. See generally LYNN MATHER, CRAIG A. McEWEN & RICHARD G. MAIMAN, DIVORCE
LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE (2001).
83. Pay Your Cards Right, THE SUN (U.K), Nov. 8, 2008, at 33.
84. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1985); ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCI-
ETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (Mark Ritter trans., 1992); EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANG-
ING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002).
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pie. The movement from a goods-based to a service-based economy
increases executory contracts, since there is almost always a time dif-
ference between payment for and performance of a service. In a bar-
ter economy there is little risk, other than the possibility of misvaluing
what one is exchanging. Our credit economy enormously increases
both our buying power and our risk. Parties may seek to control that
risk by making it reciprocal: purchasers of package tours may reduce
the chance of bad accommodations by withholding part of the pay-
ment until they return. Creditors may reduce the risk of default by
keeping borrowers permanently in debt. Lenders use more sophisti-
cated methods for calculating credit worthiness, although banks
clearly did not do so in the sub-prime meltdown.85 Potential plaintiffs
may reduce risk through loss insurance for earning capacity, property
against theft or accidental destruction, title to real property, and medi-
cal care. Social insurance for injury or illness, loss of employment, or
natural disasters, is another alternative to litigation. The larger an ec-
onomic disaster, the less likely it is to produce litigation because gov-
ernment will rescue the failing enterprise: Chrysler, Lockheed, the
savings and loan industry, and now Bear Stearns and sub-prime
mortgages.8 6
VI. CHANGES WITHIN THE FORUM
The relative advantages of courts and their functional alternatives
influence which of them litigants choose. Courts are shaped by a vari-
ety of incentives. Judges may be under pressure to clear their dockets
because of backlog and inadequate resources or to maximize their
caseloads in order to secure more funding. Courts may expand their
capacity to process cases by appointing masters, referees, and magis-
trates when they cannot increase the number of judges. Courts may
accelerate the disposition of cases by default (because defendants fail
to appear) or dismissal (because plaintiffs fail to prosecute) or press
both sides to settle (what Galanter calls litigotiation). 87 This may
make courts more or less attractive depending on whether plaintiffs
want a full hearing, an adjudicated victory, or leverage in
negotiations. 88
85. See Cho & Irwin, supra note 81.
86. See id.
87. Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984).
88. See generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION wrrH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002).
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, There are numerous functional alternatives to generalist courts.
Specialist courts have been created for tax, patents, customs, juveniles,
small claims, family, immigration, bankruptcy, mental illness, probate,
and more recently drugs and other crimes. Cases may move among
local, state, national, regional, foreign, and international courts. Cases
may be framed as civil or criminal.89 A domestic dispute, for instance,
may provoke a call to the police, a tort claim, or a divorce. Parties
may choose among a variety of alternative dispute processes, includ-
ing direct negotiation (which resolves the vast majority of disputes),
mediation (in divorce), and arbitration (of labor disputes). Dominant
parties increasingly require arbitration of conflicts arising out of
agreements about employment, health care, and investment; individu-
als have little choice but to sign these adhesion contracts. Sometimes
the law itself mandates arbitration, as in medical malpractice. Re-
venge may be dictated by codes of honor. Even when it is not, self-
help may be the only alternative if other venues are unavailable or
powerless. Some grievants just find it more effective to appeal to a
patron with political influence. Self-help often is secret 90: sorcery in
tribal societies, for instance, or hiring Anthony Pellicano in
Hollywood.91 Sometimes self-help serves to make an adversary liti-
gate: destruction of boundary markers to provoke a lawsuit over title,
defamation to force the victim to contest its truth.
Because litigation is costly and slow, governments have sought to
construct administrative alternatives.92 Workers' compensation is the
classic example of substituting administration for law by eliminating
issues of fault, creating a schedule of damages, and severely capping
fees for lawyers, whom it hoped to render unnecessary. 93 This was
only partly successful. Issues of fault have returned, for instance when
employees abuse substances or get into fights, or employers deliber-
ately violate safety rules or concealed risks. Causation has become a
fertile source of litigation, not just at the physical, temporal, and
psychic margins of work (going and coming, frolic and detour) but
89. See generally SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CON-
SCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990).
90. See generally JUNE STARR, DISPUTE AND SETTLEMENT IN RURAL TURKEY: AN ETHNOG-
RAPHY OF LAW (1978).
91. David M. Halbfinger & Allison Hope Weiner, In Court Files, Hollywood's Mr. Fix-It at
Work, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2007, at Al.
92. Marxist legal theoreticians like Pashukanis maintained that by ending class conflict, com-
munism would substitute administration for law, thereby taking the first step on the path toward
the withering away of the state. EVGENY BRONISLAVOVICH PASHUKANIS, THE GENERAL THE-
ORY OF LAW AND MARXISM 61, 175-76 (Barbara Einhorn trans., Transaction Publishers 1978).
93. PHILIPPE NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: ADVOCACY AND CHANGE IN A GOVERN-
MENT AGENCY 24, 29-30 (1969).
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also with respect to the many occupational illnesses whose etiology is
obscure (e.g., stress, heart disease, and cancer). Scheduled damages
leave uncompensated gaps, such as the loss of sensory perception or
procreative or sexual ability or heightened sensitivity to chemicals.
And schedules never keep pace with inflation.
Nevertheless, there have been efforts to emulate workers' compen-
sation in no-fault compensation for automobile accidents in the
United States 94 and medical malpractice in Sweden. 95 No-fault di-
vorce was intended to simplify the termination of marriages, shifting
conflict over property and children from courts to mediators, assisted
by social workers and psychologists. 96 No-fault compensation funds
have been created for victims of crime,97 workplace illnesses such as
black lung,98 the consequences of government programs such as vac-
cinations, 99 and national tragedies such as the 9/11 attack a00 and the
Virginia Tech shootings.101 Social insurance transforms issues that
might be litigated into administrative matters: the distribution of
health care, income maintenance, disaster relief, veterans' benefits,
and pensions. But badly administered programs can create as much
litigation as they eliminate, as when the Reagan Administration en-
gaged in wholesale withdrawals of Social Security Insurance.10 2 To-
day a very substantial portion of the dockets of United States Courts
of Appeals is consumed by immigration because the performance of
the administrative law judges is so poor. 0 3 The Bush Administra-
tion's determination to keep the trials and habeas corpus petitions of
Guantanamo detainees out of court has led to repeated judicial criti-
cism of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals and Military Commis-
94. Michelle M. Mello et al., Policy Experimentation with Administrative Compensation for
Medical Injury: Issues Under State Constitutional Law, HARV. J. ON LEGIS., Winter 2008, at 59,
78.
95. Michael M. Weinstein, No-Fault System May Be Rx For HMO's Malpractice Worries,
DENY. POST, July 26, 1998, at J-01.
96. Kit R. Roane, The State of Disunion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1996, at 13NJ.
97. Josh Mitchell, U.S. Cuts Funding for Crime Victims; Nonprofits, State, and Local Agencies
Might Curtail Services, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 14, 2008, at lB.
98. Paul J. Nyden, Workers' Comp Ok's New Black Lung Regulations, CHARLESTON GA-
ZETrE, Oct. 20, 2004, at 6A.
99. Susan Edelman, Payout Fund for Vaccines Nearly Shot, N.Y. POST, Sept. 28, 2008, at 15.
100. David W. Chen, Striking Details in Final Report on 9/11 Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2004,
at B1.
101. Anita Kumar, Judge Agrees to Va. Tech Payout; Some Families Remain Unhappy With
State, School, WASH. POST, June 18, 2008, at BO.
102. See generally JACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER, DISABLED RIGHTS: AMERICAN DISABIL-
iTY POLICY AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY 54 (2003).
103. Nina Bernstein, New York's Immigration Courts Lurch Under a Growing Burden, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at 1.
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sions and multiple appeals to the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court.10 4 The errors of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs have inflicted enormous burdens on federal courts. 10 5
Federal courts have repeatedly been forced to correct administrative
agencies politicized by the Bush Administration. 10 6
Private decisions to litigate are influenced by calculations of benefit
and cost. Newspaper headlines about large jury verdicts, which are
rarely followed by equal coverage of reduction through remittitur or
appeal, mislead potential plaintiffs about the rewards of litigation and
reinforce popular misconceptions about the "litigation crisis." The
press also is more likely to report wins than losses. Changes in success
rates can influence litigants' willingness to use the tribunal: unfair la-
bor practice complaints doubled every decade through the 1980s, 10 7
but such complaints declined after Republican presidents packed the
NLRB with members hostile to labor.108 Filing fees and bonds can
discourage the initiation of lawsuits and the pursuit of appeals. The
Supreme Court recognized this by ruling that the Constitution man-
dated filing fee waivers for indigents when the state has a monopoly,
as in divorce.' 0 9 Jury trials routinely take many years to schedule; ap-
peals can easily extend the wait for a final judgment to a decade or
more. Some jurisdictions have devised abbreviated jury trials to re-
duce the delay.110 The same obstacles that may discourage plaintiffs
from initiating litigation or persevering may persuade defendants to
settle rather than wage a costly war of attrition.
Lawyers are by far the largest litigation expense. Legal aid schemes
vary in terms of financial eligibility and substantive coverage. Since
the creation of federal legal services in 1965, the government has ex-
cluded more and more substantive areas, clients, and strategies in a
deliberate attempt to curtail litigation. The quality of legal aid may be
affected by whether it employs lawyers or reimburses private practi-
tioners and by the gap between the salaries and prestige of legal aid
lawyers and those in the private sector. Contingent fees can finance
104. See generally David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1981 (2008).
105. See generally Stu Watson, Tribes Win Court Battle Over Timber Harvest, OREGONIAN,
May 21, 2001, at D02.
106. Jim Landers, Court Blocks FCC's Media Decision-Agency Told It Must Offer Better
Reason for Erasing Ownership Rules, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 25, 2004, at ID.
107. ROBERT J. FLANAGAN, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 24 (1987).
108. Jonathan Tasini, Why Labor is at Odds with the N.L.R.B., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1988, at
14.
109. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971).
110. Steven Croley, Summary Jury Trials in Charleston County, South Carolina, 41 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 1585 (2009).
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litigation where a lump sum judgment is possible but generally only if
success if virtually certain. The United Kingdom reluctantly author-
ized conditional fees, which are similar, but not identical to contingent
fees, in order to deny legal aid to such cases.111 At the same time,
legislation may cap contingent fees in an effort to curtail litigation, as
the Medical Injuries Compensation Reform Act did in California.11 2
Caps on other fees, such as workers' compensation and veterans'
claims, may affect the quality and quantity of lawyer effort. Fee shift-
ing statutes allow successful plaintiffs to make defendants repay the
cost of litigation. Some jurisdictions require liability insurers to pay
for independent counsel if the insured's exposure exceeds the policy
limits. Legal expenses insurance is widespread in Germany and in-
creasing in the United Kingdom. Economic changes may make litiga-
tion more affordable: the dramatic inflation in house prices in recent
decades financed sophisticated divorce litigation; the bursting of the
housing bubble may ration the effort lawyers are willing to invest. Pro
bono services may be available, although only for some plaintiffs or
cases.11 3 The U.S. Supreme Court has found a constitutional obliga-
tion to provide counsel in criminal cases, but efforts to extend such a
right to civil matters have been largely unsuccessful. 114 Both parties
and lawyers can borrow money, the repayment of which is contingent
on success, but this is only available in promising cases, and interest
rates are very high.1 1 5 Some have argued that potential plaintiffs
should be able to sell causes of action to others, who might be better
able to pursue litigation, perhaps by aggregating the claims. 116
An old joke tells of the newly admitted lawyer who chose to hang
his shingle in a town with no other lawyers, in order to minimize com-
petition, and starved-until a second lawyer moved in. They lived
happily ever after suing each other. The legal analogy of Roemer's
Law-that hospital beds are the best predictor of hospitalization rates
111. Legal Aid Axed for Personal Injury Claims, BBC NEWS, Mar. 4, 1998, http://news.bbc.uk/
l/uk/61882.stm.
112. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2007).
113. See generally Philip R. Lochner, Jr., The No-Fee and Low-Fee Legal Practice of Private
Attorneys, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 431 (1975); Scott Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1 (2004).
114. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1962); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S.
10, 31 (1981).
115. Richard L. Abel, How the Plaintiffs' Bar Bars Plaintiffs, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 345,
364-72 (2007).
116. Maurice Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That Are Civil to Promote Justice That Is Civi-
lized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797, 814 (1971).
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for patients 17-may be that lawyers are the best predictor of litiga-
tion rates. Even though the U.S. Supreme Court allows states to pro-
hibit solicitation, it has extended constitutional protection to most
forms of lawyer advertising. 118 Professional associations engage in
collective efforts to promote lawyer use, for instance by encouraging
individuals to get wills drafted or have an annual legal checkup.
Many variables influence the size and growth of the legal profes-
sion. Since the 1970s, the entry of women has been the principal
source of expansion, but we have now achieved approximate gender
parity in law students and new qualified lawyers. As a result, the pro-
fession may actually shrink because a much higher proportion of
women than men leave work to raise children, and some women re-
turn only part time or not at all. Educational and financial barriers
limit access to legal education by racial minorities and the less
wealthy. The ABA still restricts the growth of the profession by its
rules for accreditation, which have discouraged for-profit law schools
and inhibited experiments in distance learning via computers. 19 State
bar examiners manipulate pass rates in order to regulate numbers. 120
Other factors affect the kind of work qualified lawyers choose to do.
Income disparities continue to grow between private and public sector
work, especially public interest work. Educational indebtedness mag-
nifies the influence of salary differences on career choices. Firms en-
large and shrink departments to reflect the relative profitability of
different kinds of work.
Although lawyers vigorously defend and seek to expand their le-
gally protected monopoly, non-lawyers are eager to perform many of
the protected functions. Insurance company claims adjusters seek to
persuade tort victims not to litigate by offering settlements.12' In the
United Kingdom, claims assessors can aggressively solicit injury vic-
tims, counsel them about their legal rights, negotiate settlements, and
offer lawyer referrals to those unwilling or unable to settle.1 22
Notarios and other non-lawyers advise non-citizens about their legal
117. Milton I. Roemer, Bed Supply and Hospital Utilization: A Natural Experiment, Hospi.
TALS, Nov. 1, 1961, at 36.
118. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 449 (1978); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 505 U.S. 618, 620 (1995).
119. Karen Sloan, Online Law Schools Gain Popularity, Not Accreditation, BROWARD DAILY
Bus. REV., Nov. 12, 2008, at 9.
120. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 562 (1984) (plaintiff alleged that bar passage procedures
constituted an antitrust violation).
121. H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 18 (1970).
122. RICHARD L. ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE: THE POLITICS
OF PROFESSIONALISM 230-33 (2003).
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rights and help them regularize their status, which can lead to litiga-
tion in immigration court and appeals to United States courts of ap-
peals. Companies like Nolo and Quicken sell both hard copy and on-
line forms, enabling parties to litigate pro se in divorce and bank-
ruptcy proceedings, for instance. Paralegals help parents seek Individ-
ual Educational Plans under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, which can lead to litigation with school districts.
VII. So WHAT'S THE WEATHER GOING TO BE?
It would be foolhardy to make specific predictions about litigation
in 2020. It is a composite of diverse behaviors. The known variables
are too numerous and volatile, and unpredictable influences might
emerge. I hope, nevertheless, that my overview suggests some of the
ways in which we might shape the civil docket or estimate the re-
sources it will require.
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